Order Subcontracting Versus Platform Employment in Blockchain-Enabled Agricultural Supply Chains

In this article, we present a novel cooperative model to address challenges in platform-enabled supply chains (PSCs) involving heterogeneous smallholder farmers. We examine a blockchain-based platform framework under two cooperation models: order subcontracting and platform employment. By analyzing order allocation and pricing decisions under symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios, we incorporate farmer heterogeneity to identify optimal cooperation models. Our findings show that while retail prices and order assignments remain consistent across both models, land transfer prices are significantly higher under order subcontracting. Neither farmers nor platforms consistently hold profitability advantages in PSCs. The choice of cooperation model is influenced by key factors (i.e., profit allocation and annual employment costs), especially under complete information. In addition, farmer profits are primarily driven by order quantity, with production costs closely tied to per-period yields. This study contributes to the literature by introducing a novel PSC framework that integrates blockchain technology and explicitly incorporates farmer heterogeneity. It also reveals how information asymmetry shapes cooperation outcomes in two distinct production–sales models, offering critical insights for researchers and practitioners aiming to develop equitable and efficient agricultural supply chains.

期刊文章

IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 72, 3499-3517